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 When Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani offered me the position of Corporation 
Counsel in early December 1993, I recognized the high honor he was conferring on 
me and accepted right away.  As I said at my resignation ceremony four years later, I 
acted quickly because I was afraid he would change his mind.  The Corporation 
Counsel, who heads the New York City Law Department, has one of the most 
challenging and exciting legal positions in the United States, a position enlivened not 
merely by the size of the office and the broad range of issues within its jurisdiction, 
but also because of the unique, litigious nature of New Yorkers.
 Some think that politics is the art of the possible, but in reality, it would be 
better to say that politics is the art of making what is necessary possible.  In January 
1994, the city was laboring under a crime wave, rising numbers on the welfare rolls, 
a falling economy and mounting budget deficits.  Clearly, the city had to change. 
But almost every decision the city makes, whether it is implementing a federal or 
state directive, or implementing a policy or program of its own, is subject to litigation. 
Many of Mayor Giuliani’s changes in policing, zoning, welfare, labor negotiations, 
and the allocation of powers between the mayor and the city council, to name but a 
few, broke the existing consensus on governance in the city and ushered in a new era. 
It is not surprising that many of these decisions were litigated.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL’S OFFICE AND THE   
 INFLUENCE OF ALLEN SCHWARTZ
 I had previously served in the Koch administration, as the Commissioner of the 
Offices of Financial Services (1984), Commissioner of Finance (1984–1986), and 
Commissioner of Housing, Preservation and Development (1986–1988).  During 
that time, I came to know the New York City Law Department.  It had an impressive 
array of dedicated, talented lawyers who were highly professional and deeply 
motivated to achieve the greatest public good.
 Those qualities were a perfect ref lection of Allen Schwartz, the Corporation 
Counsel who brought sweeping change to the Law Department, making it the 
conscientious and dedicated place it is today.  That is not to suggest that the Law 
Department did not have talented leadership before his arrival, nor to suggest that it 
did not attract able lawyers.  The Law Department has always had a reservoir of 
able, hardworking attorneys.  Indeed, the greatest strength of the Law Department 
today is its executive leadership, many of whom started their public service careers 
prior to Allen Schwartz becoming the Corporation Counsel in 1978.
 Physically, Allen Schwartz’s greatest contribution was the relocation of the Law 
Department from its antiquated offices in the Municipal Building to 100 Church 
Street, its home for the last three decades.  The move to new offices that were modern 
and efficient was a vote of confidence in the Law Department and gave its attorneys 
and staff a sense that their work was both important and highly valued.  It was even 
more significant at the time because the city had not yet emerged from the doldrums 
of the early 1970s financial crisis.
 Allen Schwartz also made more subtle, but no less significant, changes.  He led 
the fight to give the Law Department the resources it needed to provide legal services 
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to New York City.  Measured against the city’s financial crisis, these simple, sensible 
decisions had a profound impact on the Law Department.  Before his tenure, pads 
and pencils were rationed.  A new pad would not be issued unless the lawyer turned 
in the spine from his old pad.  (Sorry, only one pad per lawyer.)  Similarly, new 
pencils were issued when the stub of the old pencil was produced and the supply 
clerk was satisfied that there was no useful life left in the pencil.  While hard to 
imagine now, the opportunity to get the basic supplies a lawyer needed to do a 
professional job must have been a real boost to confidence.
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Allen Schwartz succeeded in removing 
the Law Department from the grasp of the civil service laws.  Once conceived as a 
barrier to the inf luence of politics in city employment, the civil service system 
restricted motivation and efficiency in the Law Department.1  Allen Schwartz 
implemented a merit-based system for hiring, promoting, and retaining lawyers. 
With this change, a young lawyer’s appointment no longer depended on a score on 
an examination or a reference from a political leader.  Further, his continued 
employment no longer depended on civil service status.  Lawyers had to perform and 
could not rest on prior accomplishments.  The sole determinants for advancement 
and retention were merit, qualification for the position, and success and achievement 
once employed.  The system is still in place today, and each succeeding Corporation 
Counsel during the last three decades has continued to implement the policies 
initiated by Allen Schwartz.
 Mayor Giuliani was also familiar with the Law Department.  He had previously 
served as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, where 
Emory Bruckner established a merit-only hiring system in the mid-1920s.  It remains 
a source of pride that the office has maintained that tradition for more than eight 
decades.  Thus, Mayor Giuliani certainly recognized the impact that the merit-only 
selection process had on the Law Department.  While his election as mayor prompted 
wholesale changes at a number of city agencies, no such changes were made at the 
Law Department.  Given the favorable experiences the Mayor and I had with the 
Law Department during our years of public service in New York City, we were 
convinced that the Law Department was highly professional, competently structured, 
and dedicated to public service.
 During my tenure as Corporation Counsel, the Law Department hired over 
three hundred lawyers.  Newly hired lawyers had to make a three-year commitment 
to public service, and almost all honored that commitment.  The commitment was 
exclusive because outside law practice is forbidden.  Many younger lawyers choose to 
leave at the end of the three-year commitment to pursue more lucrative opportunities 
1. The civil services laws had the original goal of insulating state and city employees from the arbitrary 
exercise of political power.  Public employment was to be based on merit and fitness, as determined by 
written examination.  With the growth of public employee unions, however, the civil services laws were 
used to shield public employees from legitimate oversight, and appropriate management scrutiny.  The 
housing police union, for instance, attempted to use the civil services laws to preserve their own union, 
rather than have their members merged with the NYPD, even though the civil services laws were never 
intended to frustrate the accomplishment of a municipal initiative to improve public safety.
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in the private sector.  But during my tenure, the Law Department was expanding so 
there were not only replacement positions to be filled, but new opportunities as 
well.2
 One of the primary tasks of the Corporation Counsel is to find competent young 
lawyers eager to fill these positions.  To that end, the Law Department began 
recruiting on campus at both local and national law schools, where applicants met 
with multiple interviewers.  These interviewers passed along their impressions, along 
with grades, writing samples, and any letters of recommendation, to a panel consisting 
of the Law Department’s executives and division chiefs.  The best applicants 
eventually interviewed with me.  I saw at least two applicants for every position, 
without exception.  While the Law Department received numerous recommendations 
from city hall, the city council, and various elected and community leaders, these 
recommendations were put into the normal hiring process.  Those that emerged 
from the process were hired; those that did not were not.  The various power-brokers 
recognized our firm commitment to merit-based hiring and transparency.  While 
some applicants were disappointed, I never received a complaint from city hall 
concerning a decision not to hire a recommended applicant.
 We hired candidates at the Law Department based on the candidate’s interview, 
grades, extracurricular activities (especially pro bono activities), success in college, 
and an analysis of the applicant’s writing sample.  The sample was used to ascertain 
the applicant’s ability to organize facts and to find and apply the correct law.  The 
Law Department was a signatory to the Association of the Bar’s plan to achieve 
diversity, and diversity of legal talent was a hiring objective.  No one was hired for 
their ideology or their party affiliation.  Instead, we considered the applicant’s 
competence, willingness to work, and ability to cooperate, to learn, to respect the 
law, and to be professional in every respect.  That process, applied consistently over 
the last thirty years, has imbued the Law Department with the unique strengths and 
abilities that the Corporation Counsel draws upon to provide advice to the city’s 
elected leadership.
III. LITIGATING THE GIULIANI AGENDA
 As already indicated, the Law Department is at the center of a litigation storm. 
As a litigator, I decided that I would try to handle, wherever I could, the major 
litigation battles that were critical to accomplishing city goals.
2. As Corporation Counsel, I also interviewed candidates for the general counsel position of every 
municipal agency.  No one could occupy one of those positions without prior interviews and consent by 
the Corporation Counsel.  During my tenure, we also reexamined the legal work of the agencies, and 
recaptured some of the positions to insulate the Law Department’s budgets from cuts that the city 
agencies were experiencing.  For every two legal positions cut at an agency, the Law Department was 
allowed to add one legal position.
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 A. Consolidating the Police Functions
 The first such battle grew out of Mayor Giuliani’s plan to integrate the city’s 
three separate police forces—the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), the 
Housing Authority Police Department (“HAPD”), and the Transit Authority Police 
Department (“TAPD”)—into a single New York City Police Department.  In 1994, 
each police agency had its own structure, including command and related 
administrative units for recruitment, training, and personnel.  This duplication was 
very wasteful of scarce resources, and went so far that each police service had its own 
bagpipe band.  If combined, those overhead units could be redeployed as forces 
available for fighting crime.  Additionally, each of the separate forces had its own 
territorial imperatives and individual fiefdoms that made inter-departmental 
cooperation difficult and—at the very least—inconsistent.  If a crime did not occur 
in public housing, by and large, the HAPD was less concerned; the same held true 
for the TAPD, who concentrated its efforts in the subways.  On the other hand, the 
NYPD was less concerned with crime in the territorial domains of the other two 
departments.  Surely a better way to police New York City could be achieved if the 
three forces, with three separate missions, were integrated into a single command 
structure.
 Mayor Giuliani’s goal was not a new one.  Mayor Koch had tried to merge the 
TAPD with the NYPD, and, before that, Mayor Lindsay had tried to do the same 
with the HAPD.  The double-merger plan raised significant civil service, pension, 
labor, and government funding issues, as well as the institutional reluctance of the 
Housing Authority and the Transit Authority to cede control of their own police 
force.  It was clear that change was going to be resisted.  The Law Department 
conducted significant research on these issues and determined that the Civil Service 
Law—the most significant legal impediment to the merger—did not stand in the 
way of the police merger plan.
 In early 1994, Mayor Giuliani went forward with his plan to merge the HAPD 
into the NYPD.  For the next nine months, the Law Department worked with city 
hall, the NYPD, and the Housing Authority to enter into the appropriate agreements 
to transfer the HAPD functions to the NYPD.  We also sought the approval of the 
city council.  The agreement required the approval of the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).  HUD indicated its initial approval of 
the plan, but requested a public hearing that took place before Congress on September 
15, 1994.  HUD’s commitment, which Mayor Giuliani obtained, was critical because 
HUD funded the housing police; a loss of that federal funding would cripple the 
merger.
 On the very day of the congressional hearing, the housing authority police union 
sued to enjoin the merger, arguing that the city lacked the authority to merge agency 
functions under the Civil Service Law.  An acting supreme court justice sitting in 
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Manhattan agreed and enjoined the merger in Nickels v. New York City Housing 
Authority.3
 The Law Department appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department, 
where Mr. Justice Williams wrote for a unanimous court and reversed the decision 
below.  As with so many city actions, the question turned on the appropriate 
interpretation of a statute, here, Civil Service Law section 70, which governs civil 
service transfers.  Generally, the section prohibits transfers, except where certain 
specified conditions are met.  Civil Service Law section 70(2), however, provides that 
where entire functions are transferred between agencies, rather than piecemeal 
staffing or limited operational shifts, the sole requirement is the preservation of the 
employees’ civil service classification and status, without further examination or 
qualification.  The statute’s listing of approved functional transfers, however, did not 
include a transfer from an authority (such as the Housing Authority) to an agency 
(such as the NYPD).  Accordingly, the Housing Police union argued that Civil 
Service Law section 70(2) did not authorize the merger of the Authority’s police 
force into the NYPD.4 
 The Law Department found statutory support for its argument that Civil Service 
Law section 70(2) did authorize the merger in Public Housing Law sections 32 and 
402(5).  Those provisions made clear that by imposing the statutory requirements of 
civil service on HAPD officers, a benefit the officers had sought years ago, the 
Authority became a civil agency for the purposes of the Civil Service Law. 
Accordingly, the function of the HAPD was eligible for transfer under Civil Service 
Law section 70(2).5
 The housing police union made a final stab at blocking the merger under Civil 
Service Law section 70(5).  That section provides for the consolidation of police 
departments, but not in cities of “one million or more persons”—a clause that, in 
Albany’s parlance, means “New York City.”  The Law Department’s research turned 
to the legislation’s bill jacket, and found that the purpose of Civil Service Law section 
70(5) was to protect police officers where their public employer was disbanding its 
police force.  The bill jacket made it clear that the new law would have no application 
where the transferee department had assumed responsibility for the transferred 
function(s) under Civil Service Law section 70(2). 6
 The housing police union also argued that their members’ pension rights were 
being violated.  But Mr. Justice Williams brushed these arguments aside, holding 
that the pension benefits for housing police and city police were essentially equal. 
3. 621 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994), rev’d, 622 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1st Dep’t 1995), aff ’d, 85 
N.Y.2d 917 (1995).
4. Nickels, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 718–22.
5. See id. at 722–23.
6. Id. at 722–23 (citing N.Y. State Conference of Mayors, Bill Jacket, L. 1989, ch. 483, at 19; N.Y. State 
Assoc. of Counties, Bill Jacket, L. 1989, ch. 483, at 31); see also N.Y. Civil Service Law § 70(5) (1958) 
(stating in the Memorandum of State and Civil Service Department on 1958 Revisions that the bill 
“expressly provides that no employee shall be transferred without his consent except under the transfer 
of functions”).
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Since there would be no loss of benefits (only enhancements), there could be no 
injury.7  After argument in the New York Court of Appeals, that court unanimously 
affirmed, adopting the opinion of Mr. Justice Williams.8
 While the litigation battle with the housing police union was going on, the city 
locked horns with the Transit Authority over the second step in the police merger 
plan.  Here, the configuration of the litigants was different.  In the housing police 
merger, the Authority and New York City agreed to the merger, but the housing 
police union objected.  With the Transit Authority (“TA”), the situation was just the 
reverse.  The transit police union agreed to the merger, but the TA objected, insisting 
that the city continue to provide its subsidy so that the TA could maintain the transit 
police.
 Most New Yorkers do not realize that the city owns the subway system, but 
leases it to the TA for operation.  The lease is a long and complicated document, 
which governs how the system is to be operated and paid for.  One of the lease 
obligations calls for the city to provide a direct subsidy to the TA for transit police 
services.  As it had with the Housing Authority, the city attempted to negotiate a 
voluntary amendment to the lease, which would provide for a merger of the TAPD 
and NYPD functions.  The TA refused.  This was not exactly a surprise, as the TA 
had previously rejected Mayor Koch’s attempts to merge the transit police with the 
NYPD in the mid-1980s.9
 When it became clear that the TA would not negotiate a voluntary merger, the 
Law Department recommended that the city exercise its rights under the lease, 
giving the required ninety days notice of its intent to terminate the reimbursement of 
transit police costs.  The TA responded publicly that the city was putting “a gun to 
its head.”  Indeed, if the city went through with its cancellation of funds, none of the 
TA’s choices were to its liking.  If the TA wanted to maintain the transit police, 
without the city paying for it, the TA would have had to either cut back other services, 
obtain state aid, or raise transit fares to generate the funds necessary to maintain the 
transit police.  The other choice was to lay off the police, though this final option 
was not as much of a threat as it would seem, because the city had publicly promised 
to hire any laid-off transit police officers.
 Faced with these undesirable choices, the TA chose to litigate and demanded 
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).  The lease’s 
arbitration provision, however, was not typical.  It did not provide that “all disputes 
are subject to arbitration.”  Instead, the arbitration clause provided for arbitration of 
any fact question before the AAA, but questions of law were to be arbitrated by the 
Appellate Division, First Department.
7. Nickels, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 723–25.
8. Nickels, 85 N.Y.2d at 919.
9. It is worth noting that the Law Department did substantial work on Mayor Koch’s proposed transit 
merger in the 1980s, and that the research was the backbone of the Law Department’s work ten years 
later to justify the housing police merger.  It is a vivid demonstration of the value of continuity in the 
Law Department.
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 The Law Department moved, pursuant to C.P.L.R. section 7503(b), to stay or 
dismiss the arbitration demanded by the TA on the grounds that there was no valid 
basis for arbitration.  There were no questions of fact.  It was clear what the city had 
done and why it was doing it.  Nor were there any legal questions, because the lease 
gave the city the unilateral right to cancel on ninety days notice.  In other words, the 
city had the clear right to cancel the police funding lease term on ninety days notice, 
and the exercise of that right was non-arbitrable.  When the Law Department made 
its motion, the appellate division had not yet made its decision in the housing police 
case.  The only legal opinion was that of the acting supreme court justice in the 
Nickels case, which held that the proposed merger was not authorized by the Civil 
Service Law.10
 The TA maintained that there was a factual question about whether the city had 
exercised its rights under the lease in bad faith and intentionally brought unfair 
pressure to bear on the TA Board.  The court rejected these arguments and found no 
factual question for arbitration.  Instead, Mr. Justice Ramos pointed out that the TA 
did not have a right to have its own police force funded by the city.  As to the TA’s 
argument concerning bad faith, the court rejected it.  The city’s goal was to control 
the police services it was paying for.  “Since the act of termination is specifically 
permitted in the lease and is not motivated by an ulterior motive, exercising that 
right to facilitate merger or consolidation of police functions cannot be an act of bad 
faith.”11
 The TA also argued, based on the lower court’s decision in the Housing Authority 
case, that the merger of police functions was not authorized by the Civil Service 
Law.12  Justice Ramos rejected this argument as well.  He recognized that, despite 
certain lingering legal technicalities, nothing barred the expansion of NYPD 
jurisdiction to provide police services to the transit system.13
 The court granted the city’s motion to stay arbitration.  While the TA filed a 
notice of appeal, and said it would appeal to the appellate division, the notice was 
withdrawn on the same day it was filed, or shortly thereafter.  Instead, the TA and 
the city proceeded to renegotiate the lease along the lines the city initially proposed 
to the TA.  The amended lease permitted the merger of the two police functions in 
accordance with police service standards.  The revised lease was approved by the TA 
Board.
 On June 19, 1995, at One Police Plaza, Mayor Giuliani presided over a ceremony 
that retired the f lags of the HAPD and the TAPD.  By successfully unifying police 
services in New York City, the Giuliani administration achieved the goal of every 
mayoral administration for the prior thirty years.  There were ancillary civil service 
and pension challenges, but each was dealt with in turn.  The Law Department had 
10. Nickels, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 723–25.
11. City of New York v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1995, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1995).
12. Id.; see also Nickels, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
13. N.Y. City Transit Authority, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25, 1995, at 28.
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provided critical legal assistance through five of its divisions: Legal Counsel Division 
(which prepared the Civil Services Law memo used for the proposed transit police 
merger in 1986); General Litigation and Appeals (which worked on all litigation 
aspects); Pensions (which resolved intricate questions of how the transit and housing 
police pensions—a part of the New York City Employee Retirement System—would 
be accommodated in the NYPD’s separate Police Pension System); and Contracts 
and Real Estate (advising the lease aspects of the TA-city transit leasing agreement 
and its amendments).
 B. Reviving the Home Rule Requirements
 Shortly after the merger was implemented, the city faced a new police challenge. 
This time, it came from the NYPD’s Patrolman Benevolent Association (“PBA”). 
Here, rather than trying to alter the existing order, the Law Department was charged 
with preserving the status quo for handling collective bargaining impasses.  The 
PBA had successfully lobbied Albany to obtain legislation that provided a new 
procedure for handling collective bargaining impasses for New York City police.14 
Mayor Giuliani had objected to the legislation and Governor Pataki vetoed it, but 
the state legislature overrode the veto.
 As with so many questions about the city’s powers, this case turned on the correct 
interpretation of a complicated statutory scheme.  Public service employees in New 
York State are forbidden to strike under the state’s Taylor Act.15  As something of a 
relief valve for this strict prohibition on strikes, the legislature created a mandatory 
arbitration procedure before the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”), a 
state tribunal designed to adjust and resolve collective bargaining impasses.16  When 
this mandatory arbitration provision was added in 1974, New York City was exempted 
from its coverage because the city already provided for police and fire impasse 
bargaining with its own Board of Collective Bargaining.17  State legislation authorized 
local governments to create their own “mini-PERBs,” provided they were “substantially 
equivalent” to the PERB, and PERB approved the local law.18  With regard to New 
York City, however, the procedures were deemed effective by the legislature, and the 
legislation provided that they would remain so, unless and until they were challenged 
by PERB and found by a state court to be not substantially equivalent to the PERB 
procedure.19
14. See 1996 N.Y. Sess. Laws S. 5779, A. 8482 (McKinney).
15. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 210(1) (McKinney 2008).
16. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 205(5), 209(4) (McKinney 2008).
17. See 1974 N.Y. Laws 1882–89.
18. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 212(1) (McKinney 2007).  A number of cities and counties, including Syracuse 
and the counties of Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk, had taken advantage of this option.  When the 
populations of New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester are combined, it is clear that more 
than two-thirds of New York State’s population had opted for coverage under a locally authorized mini-
PERB, rather than the state PERB.
19. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 212(2) (McKinney 2007).
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 The PBA was dissatisfied with the results it achieved before the city’s mini-
PERB, and it decided to seek legislation to change the forum for mandatory 
arbitration of its salary disputes.  The legislation it sought was embodied in Chapter 
13 of the Laws of 1996 (“Chapter 13”), which provided in section 1: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law to the contrary, the public employment relations board 
may invoke procedures to be followed in the event of disputes which reach an impasse 
in the course of collective negotiations between the public employer and the New 
York City Police.”20  Section 2 removed the exemption of the New York City police 
and fire department members from PERB’s binding arbitration process.
 After considerable research, the Law Department found a way to challenge 
Chapter 13 and preserve the city’s stewardship of its public employee arbitration 
mechanism.  Article 9 of the New York State Constitution guarantees that local 
government shall have authority over matters of local concern.  The state government 
must act by general law, but it may enact a special law, of local application only, 
where the local government requests the legislature to do so by way of a “home rule 
message.”21  The key question is whether a law is “general” as opposed to “local” or 
“special.”  In most cases, the distinction is clear.  Whereas municipal taxes and local 
transportation are matters of general application and are routinely subject to state 
legislation, Albany very rarely deals with issues such as zoning or landmarks 
preservation, which are considered matters of local concern.
 The Law Department argued that Chapter 13 was a “special law” that required a 
home rule message from the New York City Council, because it applied only to 
police in New York City.  Since the local governing body—the New York City 
Council—had neither adopted a home rule message nor had the Mayor asked for 
one, the Law Department saw an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of 
Chapter 13.
 The New York Court of Appeals held that Chapter 13 was a special law and 
required a home rule message.  Accordingly, for the first time in over sixty years, the 
court found that the home-rule provisions of the state constitution had been violated.22 
Judge Levine held that the law was a special law and applied only to New York City, 
and only to police within the city.23  Indeed, “only New York City, among all units of 
local government throughout the state, is prohibited from providing for a local public 
employment relations board with jurisdiction over binding arbitration procedures 
when an impasse is reached in negotiations with its police force.”24
 While the legislature claimed it was establishing a uniform policy for dealing 
with impasse procedures, in reality, it had created a unique, one-of-a-kind process. 
20. 1996 N.Y. Sess. Laws 43, 43 (McKinney).
21. N.Y. Const. art. 9, §§ 1, 2(b)(1).  Per the state constitution, a home rule message is sent to the state 
legislature “on the request of two-thirds of the total membership . . . or on request of its chief executive 
officer concurred in by a majority of such membership.” Id. § 2(b)(2)(a).
22. City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assoc. of the City of N. Y., 89 N.Y.2d 380 (1996).
23. Id. at 393–94.
24. Id. at 389.
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It did so when it was clear that the local mini-PERBs were substantially equivalent 
to PERB, and further, that PERB had never challenged New York City’s mini-
PERB.  Indeed, the sole object of the legislation was to create a forum for the PBA 
to pursue its claim for higher pay.
 An exception to the state constitution’s requirement of obtaining a home rule 
message from the local governing body exists where the legislation is of sufficient 
general importance to the state to justify state legislation.25  Judge Levine relied on 
Judge Cardozo’s framing of the issue in Adler v. Deegan: “has the State surrendered 
the power to enact local laws by the usual forms of legislation where subjects of State 
concern are directly and substantially involved, though intermingled with these [local 
concerns]?”26  Judge Levine found that Chapter 13 did not “directly and substantially” 
involve or serve a supervening state concern.27
 The PBA and the state attorney general argued that police compensation was 
substantially involved with public safety, which was a legitimate matter of general, 
and therefore state, concern.  Judge Levine rejected the argument out of hand.  He 
said it would be 
absolutely inconsistent with the sensitive balancing of State and local interests 
. . . to allow the State to justify legislation inimical to the constitutional values 
of the home rule article based purely on the considerations having no apparent 
role in its enactment, no matter how plausibly conceived as an afterthought.28
A brief review of the debates on the f loor of the legislature showed a complete 
absence of discussion of public safety.  The debate concerned the need for uniformity. 
But as previously pointed out, the legislation interrupted a harmonious scheme, 
which had worked well for years, and created in its place a procedure applicable only 
to New York City and its police department.  As there was no general, supervening 
state concern, there was no exception to the state constitution’s home rule requirement. 
The city was able to preserve its mini-PERB as the body, which would deal with 
collective bargaining impasses, as it had for the previous two decades.
 C. Overcoming Consent Decrees
 In 1994, when I became Corporation Counsel, I found that much of the city’s 
discretion to run its affairs in the manner its elected officials deemed best had been 
bargained away in a series of consent decrees, which state and federal courts enforced. 
Those decrees covered human resources, corrections, education, police, homeless 
services, and environmental protection, among others, removing vast areas of the city 
budget from the democratic process.  The actions of a city agency were not determined 
by the mayor, or the commissioner, or the city council, but rather by litigation and 
negotiations between advocates, city lawyers, and a judge.  This process would dictate 
25. Id. (citing Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 538 (1982)).
26. Id. at 390 (citing Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 489–90 (1929) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
27. Id. at 392.
28. Id. at 391.
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what an agency could or could not do.  As a result, a disproportionate share of scarce 
municipal resources were devoted to satisfying consent decree requirements, which 
were quite often unrelated to the most serious and pressing problems confronting the 
city.  The city’s mandates were growing at a time when budgetary resources were 
shrinking, skewing the city’s ability to properly allocate resources to tackle its most 
fundamental problems.
 One of my chief goals as Corporation Counsel was to avoid signing any further 
consent decrees.  Additionally, I tried to extricate the city from these extraordinary 
procedures wherever possible to return these agency functions to the city’s ordinary 
processes for budget, administration, and day-to-day control.  In the latter regard, 
the city achieved modest success.  For example, the city acted quickly to obtain relief 
after the congressional enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. 
Until that point, the federal court oversaw management of the city’s prison system, 
including such details as the frequency with which prison windows had to be washed 
and the composition of the washing solutions.  The Act, however, required the 
termination of consent decrees affecting prison management in the absence of a 
finding that inmates’ constitutional rights had been violated.  The city was granted 
some modest relief.29
 In the human resources area, the city had litigated the appropriate method for 
the placement of foster children, regardless of their race, starting in 1973.  In 1986, 
it entered into the Wilder consent decree, which governed the procedures for 
placement.30  By the time of the decree, however, the grievances of the original 
complaint had changed into something substantially different.  Wilder covered a 
great variety of ensuing litigation, but never finally resolved the parties’ disputes, if 
only because the nature of the dispute kept changing.31  Mayor Giuliani decided to 
29. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1994).  The difficulties inherent in consent decrees are ably 
covered in Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When 
Courts Run Government (2003).  I agree with Sandler and Schoenbrod.  Judge Harold Baer, who 
succeeded Morris Lasker as the United States District Court Judge who supervises the jail consent 
decrees, has a much different view.  His views on the value of the federal court’s supervision of the city 
jail system and the positive outcomes achieved because of the consent decrees supervision by the court 
are summarized in an article he prepared with Arminda Bepko.  Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A 
Necessary and Proper Role for Federal Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees, 
52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3 (2007).
30. See generally Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
31. The original lawsuit alleged that Catholic and Jewish foster care agencies discriminated against 
Protestant children who were African American.  Over the course of the next quarter century, the 
parties litigated over how children should be tested and evaluated, how the quality of foster care agencies 
should be evaluated, how children should be placed, and how foster care children should be given access 
to abortion services.  Whatever else may be said of these issues, they are far afield from the original 
allegations of discrimination in the placement of African American children.  For a detailed history of 
the Wilder litigation, see Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court); 
Wilder v. Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff ’d, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988); Wilder v. Bernstein, 725 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989), rev’d, 944 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated, 965 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
954 (1992); Wilder v. Bernstein, No. 78 CIV. 957 (RJW), 1994 WL 30480 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1994); 
Wilder v. Bernstein, 153 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), appeal dismissed, 49 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995); 
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remove the foster care function from the Human Resources Department, and create 
the Administration for Children’s Services whose primary mission was the care of 
children, especially those in foster care.  When the new agency adopted a plan for 
these children, it opened up the opportunity to finally end the Wilder consent decree. 
That relief was granted in Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani.32
 In the area of environmental protection, the Law Department worked from 1995 
to 1997 to help the city avoid what might have been a consent decree.  The federal 
government demanded that the city filter its water from its watershed, west of the 
Hudson.  This would have cost the city billions of capital dollars and taken years to 
implement.  A far less expensive, but equally effective way was to enter into a long-
term arrangement to maintain the city’s upstate water reservoir system by purchasing 
upstate property to buffer the city’s remote, but pristine, water supply.  The city 
commenced negotiations with the various federal, state, and local government entities 
to achieve its goal.  The city entered into a series of agreements with the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency and the state Department of Health to establish 
standards for overseeing and maintaining water quality.  The most pivotal agreements 
forged environmental and economic development partnerships with upstate 
communities, which included the construction of new water treatment plants and 
significant upgrades to existing plants.  Of course this effort was led by the 
Environmental Law Division, but its work would not have been successful without 
the assistance of the Legal Counsel, Condemnation and Certiorari, and the Municipal 
Finance Division.
 During my tenure, the city moved for relief from a decree entered in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York embodying the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Aguilar v. Felton.33  In 1965, Congress enacted, and President 
Johnson signed, Title I legislation that provided funds for the city’s Board of 
Education.34  The city used Title I funds to provide remedial English and math 
instruction by public school teachers to poor children on parochial school premises.35 
The program continued for twenty years until the Supreme Court determined that 
the presence of public school teachers on parochial school premises could no longer 
be permitted.  The Court found that the monitoring of the public school teachers on 
parochial school premises constituted an entanglement, proscribed by Lemon v. 
Wilder v. Bernstein, 975 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reconsideration denied, 982 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997); Wilder v. Bernstein, No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW), 1998 WL 323492 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 1998); Wilder 
v. Bernstein, No. 78 Civ. 957 (RJW), 1998 WL 355413 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 1, 1998).
32. 185 F.R.D. 152, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff ’d, Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2000).
33. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
34. See id. at 404.
35. Initially, the city experimented with a number of alternate plans.  For instance, needy parochial school 
children were permitted to attend public schools at the end of the school day.  Later, the city provided 
computer-assisted training on parochial school property.  Neither method proved effective in achieving 
appropriate pedagogical results.  The city then opted for sending public school teachers onto parochial 
school premises.
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Kurtzman,36 thereby violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
After the decision, a decree was entered in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York banning public school teachers from providing remedial 
education to needy children on the premises of parochial schools.
 The city continued to provide remedial instruction to eligible, parochial school 
children.  Instead of using parochial school sites, however, the city developed a 
mobile instructional unit—a classroom on a bus.  The bus would park near the 
parochial school and the eligible children would be walked from the school onto the 
bus.  This approach avoided “entanglement,” but it was not as sound as classroom 
instruction, and it was unnecessarily expensive.  For several years, Congress provided 
additional funds for the buses, but eventually the city was directed to provide the 
school bus funds from Title I funds.  This drained valuable and scarce resources 
from the city’s education budget and posed a threat to the future of remedial education 
for New York’s children.
 In Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, the Supreme Court indicated its intention to reexamine 
its Establishment Clause precedents.37  In 1995, the Law Department moved for 
relief from the Aguilar decree, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), 
arguing that it was no longer just that the Aguilar decree be given prospective effect. 
The problem with this approach was that while Kiryas Joel questioned Aguilar, Aguilar 
had not been overruled.  The city was really asking the Supreme Court to reverse 
itself in the very case in which it had adopted the rule, a direct assault on stare decisis, 
indeed the law of the case.
 Of course, the United States District Court and the Second Circuit dismissed 
the city’s case.  They had no choice but to do so under prevailing precedent.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and the city argued its case to the Supreme Court 
in April 1997.  In Agostini v. Felton, the Court overruled Aguilar in a 5-4 decision.38 
It held that monitoring public school teachers in parochial schools in order to ensure 
that they were teaching only remedial English and math did not constitute an 
excessive entanglement.39  Title I funds could be used, as they had been from 1965 to 
1985, to once again provide on-site remedial education.  It was a significant victory 
for New York City’s children.
 D. The Line Item Veto Act
 My final act as Corporation Counsel was to institute an action challenging the 
Presidential Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which authorized the president to nullify 
specific provisions of a bill, usually budget appropriations, without vetoing the entire 
legislative package.  In 1997, President Clinton exercised his authority under the 
Line Item Veto Act to delete various funds earmarked for New York City’s medical 
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
37. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
38. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
39. Id. at 205–06.
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education hospitals.  The Law Department prepared the city’s complaint to challenge 
the bill.  Senator Moynihan joined the lawsuit, as did Local 1199 of the Hospital 
Workers Union, two hospital associations, and a private hospital.  In Clinton v. The 
City of New York, the Supreme Court held by a 6-3 majority that the city and its 
co-litigants had standing to raise the issue because they suffered an injury in fact—
the loss of funding.40  Next, the Court held that the president’s exercise of the powers 
conferred by the Line Item Veto Act violated the Constitution’s Presentment Clause. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, provides that, after a bill is approved by both 
Houses of Congress, it must be presented to the president who “shall sign it,” if he 
approves, or veto it.41  The Court held that the Constitution does not allow the 
president to unilaterally amend or repeal any portion of a bill presented for signature.42 
Thus, the cancellation provisions of the Line Item Veto Act gave the president a 
power in direct violation of Article I, Section 7.  This was a significant victory for 
the city, not only in securing actual funding for the city, but also in maintaining the 
balance of power set forth in the Constitution.
 E. Charter Battles
 The Law Department had several disputes with the city council over the City 
Charter’s allocation of power.  The council contended that it had certain Charter 
powers.  The Law Department had done extensive research of the City Charter of 
1989.  In 1990, the Law Department published its opinion on the new Charter’s 
allocation of powers.  Based on this 1990 opinion, the Law Department had no 
difficulty in concluding that the council did not have the powers it purported to 
assert.  One such battle dealt with council’s role in the fight against police corruption. 
In 1995, after the Mollen Commission filed its report, the council established the 
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board and gave itself power to appoint 
several of the officers who would serve on the Board.43  At the height of the 
controversy in March 1995, New York Law School held a forum on the topic where 
the speaker of the city council warned that the mayor was not above the law—or at 
least the council’s version of it.44  While some suggested that the Law Department 
40. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
42. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420.
43. In 1992, Mayor Dinkins appointed his deputy mayor, Milton Mollen, to examine police corruption. 
Mollen issued his report in July 1994, seven months after Mayor Giuliani had taken office.  The report 
found that an overwhelming number of police officers were honest and conscientious, but there were 
some officers who engaged in a new form of corruption: brutality and abuse of authority, as opposed to 
bribe-taking and gift-giving.  Accordingly, the Mollen Commission recommended that vigorous 
oversight of the NYPD be continued and that a group, not unlike the Mollen Commission, be tasked 
with this assignment.  While Mayor Giuliani was contemplating the appropriate course of action to 
follow, the city council decided to act on its own, without the authority to do so.  Mayor Giuliani 
eventually appointed a Police Oversight Board.
44. The Law Department’s response to the city council speaker’s arguments is reported in Paul A. Crotty, 
The Corporation Counsel ’s View of Independent Oversight of the Police, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 23, 33–34 
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was only doing the mayor’s bidding, the fact of the matter is that the Law Department 
had reached an independent conclusion, which it published in an opinion four years 
earlier stating that there was no basis in the Charter for the council’s position.
 Eventually, the scholarly debate ended in state supreme court.  The court held 
that by creating an independent police panel and giving itself appointment powers, 
the council had infringed upon the City Charter’s allocation of the power to appoint 
city officers exclusively to the city executive.  The appellate division affirmed, and 
the New York Court of Appeals declined permission to appeal.45
 The council’s effort to reallocate funds in the city’s budget during mid-year was 
also rejected in a separate lawsuit.  Here, too, the Law Department was clear that 
while the council had the right to appropriate new funds (that is, new funds not 
previously appropriated), that power did not include the power to reallocate existing 
funds.  The supreme court found that the council was without the power it purported 
to assert.46
 F. Organized Crime
 The Law Department played a significant role in the efforts of Mayor Giuliani 
and Deputy Mayor Randy Mastro to rid the Fulton Street Fish Market of organized 
crime elements.  It drafted legislation requiring the licensing of all workers at the 
fish market.47  Companies that used the market sought an injunction against the 
regulatory regime in both state and federal court, but the courts refused to interfere 
with the legislation or the regulations implementing the licensing scheme.
 The Law Department was also a key player in eliminating organized crime 
influences from the Trade Waste Industry.  The Law Department drafted legislation, 
which, upon enactment, was promptly challenged as a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.  United States District Judge Milton Pollack found the city’s legislation 
was constitutional.  The Second Circuit affirmed in Sanitation & Recycling Industry 
v. City of New York.48  The Trade Waste Commission then proceeded with its effort 
to root out the illegal and anti-competitive practice of a mob dominated cartel.
 G. Economic Development
 No report of my tenure as Corporation Counsel would be complete without 
mentioning the Law Department’s role in clearing away impediments to economic 
(1995).
45. Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., Nos. 402354, 95-001, 95-003, 1995 WL 478872 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1995), aff ’d, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep’t 1997), appeal denied, 89 N.Y.2d 815 (1997).
46.  Council of N.Y. v. Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
47. The Law Department is the key drafter for almost all local legislation.  It routinely drafts legislation, 
which it proposes to the state legislature and the city council.  The legislation, which addressed the 
Fulton Street Fish Market and the Trade Waste Industry was based on the city’s right to regulate and 
license workers who are employed on city property (the fish market employees) or who work on city 
franchises (the trade waste employees).
48. 107 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1997).
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development.  Generally, the Law Department provides counsel to the city’s 
Economic Development Corporation in its numerous economic development 
transactions.  The Law Department also advises the City Planning Commission on 
development.  The Law Department was called upon to litigate an interesting First 
Amendment issue in the city’s effort to attract Fox Television to New York City. 
After Fox decided to relocate to New York City, it found that Time Warner refused 
to carry its TV programs as part of it local cable package.
 Without access to the New York City market, it did not make economic sense for 
Fox to locate its headquarters facility here.  The city determined to use one of its 
Public, Education, and Government (“PEG”) channels to carry Fox News.49  The 
city believed that those channels belonged to it and were not subject to prior clearance 
by the franchisee.  In retrospect, it may have been better for the city to have instituted 
a declaratory judgment action to vindicate what the city believed to be its right to use 
its PEG channels for a bona fide city purpose.  Instead, the city unilaterally placed 
the Fox News service on one of its PEG channels.
 Time Warner sued claiming a violation of its First Amendment rights.  The city 
believed that Time Warner had only an economic interest, which had to be weighed 
against the city’s governmental purpose.  The city’s arguments were rejected.50  While 
the city did not prevail in the litigation, Time Warner eventually agreed to carry Fox 
News on its cable system; and today, Fox News headquarters is located on Sixth 
Avenue in New York City.
 The Law Department also participated in the revitalization of Forty-second 
Street by helping to amend the city’s zoning ordinance to regulate adult uses.  While 
some in New York feign nostalgia for the way the “Deuce” used to be, few sensible 
New Yorkers pine for a return of open-air drug bazaars, street crime, prostitution, 
and adult uses that prevailed on Forty-second Street.  The threat of crime and sense 
of lawlessness—indeed, residents and tourists alike avoided the area for fear of a 
hostile confrontation—constituted a major deterrent to the area’s economic 
development.  With the reduction of crime due to targeted police enforcement, the 
restriction of adult uses, and the commercial success of the Forty-second Street 
development (a process twenty years in the making), Times Square reclaimed its 
ability to attract and entertain New Yorkers and an increasing number of tourists. 
This was good and effective government for New York City and its residents.
 The Law Department worked closely with City Planning to adopt the adult use 
zoning ordinance.  The ordinance was based on a study, which demonstrated the 
49. PEG channels were allocated to the city as a condition for the franchise to provide cable service in New 
York City.  The Law Department had previously opined that off-track betting could run horseracing 
programs on a PEG channel to facilitate its business in New York City.  Time Warner had not 
objected.
50. See Time Warner Cable v. City of New York, 943 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff ’d, 118 F.3d 917 
(2d Cir. 1997); Symposium, Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications Law, 7 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 533, 533–97 (1997) (providing a fuller explanation and rationale for the city’s 
position and Time Warner’s response; symposium covers a debate between David Goldin, who was one 
of the leading city lawyers on the case, and Robert Joffe, a partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore, who 
represented Time Warner).
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deleterious effects of the profession of so-called adult uses.  The City Planning 
decision to adopt the new measure was ratified by the city council.  Naturally, the 
club owners sued, claiming First Amendment protection, but the courts have 
consistently rejected the owners’ claims and sustained the city’s right to regulate 
adult uses.51
IV. CONCLUSION
 In focusing on these accomplishments of the Law Department, I do not mean to 
minimize the Law Department’s other significant accomplishments.  The list is 
extensive and continues to grow because of the hardworking lawyers at the New York 
City Law Department.  The fundamental changes instituted by Allen Schwartz, and 
embraced and expanded upon by each of his successors, provide the city with access 
to excellent legal advice and legions of able, dedicated attorneys who represent the 
city and its elected leadership in their efforts to provide for the common good under 
the laws of the United States, New York State, and New York City.
51. See Stringfellow’s of N.Y., Ltd. v. City of New York, 653 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996), 
aff ’d, 663 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep’t 1997).
